Jean-Claude Juncker’s innovative restructuring of the college of Commissioners is an object lesson in what appears to be the clear delineation of power (for the President) in the new Commission. It does seem though, to be an experiment in departmental polyocracy. Establishing the concept of seven overseeing senior Commissioners, six without a specific departmental portfolio, is however, an experiment that holds inherent risks, writes chief political correspondent Tim McNamara.
For Juncker, the concept of departmental polyocracy holds several advantages. He remains above the fray of disputes over policy either on a turf war between Commissioners or between an individual Commissioner and one or more vice-presidents. He becomes the arbiter of said disputes if an individual party in the dispute calls on him to intervene. He also has the ability, if he so wanted, to intervene in any policy field if the College as a body has either no portfolio responsibility or where intra-College relations have irretrievably broken down.
Under the old Commission model, the role of Vice-Presidents was much more titular than influential. Personal relations between the Commission President and individual Commissioners were far more important than name-plates on desks. Hence, it was nearly always a simple two-tier Commission with the President at the apex.
It is now apparent that the College will have at least four levels of power and influence. Firstly, there will be twenty Commissioners with specific portfolios. Secondly, the five Vice-Presidents responsible for overarching policy fields that will overlap more than one commissioner’s responsibility. Thirdly, the super Vice-President, Frans Timmermans, who has already been designated Juncker’s undisputed number two. Fourthly, the President himself and his cabinet who will have the final seal of approval on any significant commission initiatives.
Like Cathy Ashton before her, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy, will have a ‘double-hatted role’ reporting to both the Commission and the Council of Ministers. She also now has a direct supervisory role over four commissioners (trade; EU neighbourhood policy and enlargement; international cooperation and development as well as to a lesser extent three other policy fields: migration and home affairs; transport and space; plus climate action and energy).
The converse also applies. Commissioner-Designate Hill faces the prospect of six more senior commissioners intervening in his portfolio responsibilities (financial stability, financial services and capital markets union).
This formal structure does not include ad hoc interventions by either the head of the president’s cabinet, Martin Selmayer, nor the Secretary-General, currently Catherine Day, who reports directly to Juncker. Timmerman will also now have the resources of the Secretariat-General at his disposal.
Juncker’s strategic decision to structure his Commission in the manner he has done, risks over-complicating clear lines of communication. For example, whoever becomes the Vice-President for Energy Union, will have policy responsibilities that could impinge on the portfolios of twelve other Commissioners.
This myriad of power structures and the complex hierarchical relations just at the College level risks the cohesion of the College as an administrative and political body. For instance, five of the six biggest member states have no representatives at the highest levels in the commission. Of the five, only Germany seems to have had a direct influence on what type of person is allocated to particular roles and portfolios. With monetary hawks in the key financial fields, Berlin’s hardline on the Euro is set to continue.
Some EU observers also categorise Juncker’s head of cabinet, German Martin Selmayer as the unofficial “29th commissioner”. There are jokes that the president’s head of cabinet is more powerful than a Commissioner, in this case it is quite true.
Reactions from Paris already perceive the commission’s structure as an anathema to French interests. Paris profoundly disagrees that its Commissioner should be subservient to a Vice-President.
Up until now, the heads of all Commissioners’ cabinets met weekly in what is termed the ‘hebdo’, the purpose of which was to fine-tune legislation and other proposals before they were presented to the College of Commissioners. These were supposed to be a meeting of equals amongst the cabinets although the larger member states were informally a little more influential.
Hebdo will no longer be a meeting of equals, with the cabinets of the President, six vice-presidents plus the cabinet of Mogherini being clearly ‘first amongst equals’. In fact, there will be at least a two-layer hebdo with eight pre-eminent and twenty others in supporting roles. With Juncker’s head of cabinet being the most influential, either overtly or covertly.
In previous Commission structures, hierarchies and directorate-generals’ organigrams encouraged a feeling of solidarity amongst the parallel steps in the pyramid. The break-up of the two level power structure above Director-General level and its replacement by a four-level hierarchy may well be come a recipe for bureaucratic confusion and duplication.
The communication of the commission’s role and policies has also been restructured and centralised. Whilst previously there were an individual spokesperson fro each Commissioner, Juncker will reduce the number of spokespersons: now there will be three for the president, two for Mrs CFSP Federica Mogherini and 10 for all others.
At the Directorate-General level, for civil servants, who does one aim to convince? What becomes the channel(s) of communication amongst the different sources of power? If one works in DG Climate Action and Energy on energy security does one first see the responsible Commissioner, Miguel Arias Canete as one’s boss, or does one have to orientate proposals so as to convince the Vice-President for Energy Union?
If one Commissioner’s cabinet instructs civil servants in a DG to first forward all proposals via them, yet a similar instruction is given by a Vice-President’s cabinet, who decides who has precedent? It is guaranteed that this dilemma will occur early on in the next Commission.
A further complication will arise with relations between the Commission and the other main institutions, i.e. the Council of Ministers and Parliament. Does DG Trade now have to forward proposals for some anti-subsidy legislation through Vice-President Timmermanns (responsible for inter-institutional relations) as well as through the normal channels of the Commissioner for Trade and the Secretariat-General?
The other structural problem will be how many resources are given to the various Vice-Presidents. Are they expected to only have their cabinets as support staff? Does Juncker expect the Secretariat-General to give them some support staff? Or are a few civil servants from the various DGs to be attached as an elite group to each Vice-president? The possibilities for turf wars are boundless.
The chance that the proposed hierarchical structure will result in a bureaucratic and political logjam is real. Juncker’s team are going to have to move fast and be prepared to intervene far more than they probably would have foreseen. Departmental polyocracy is not an efficient method of working. However, if one adds in the inevitable clash of national interests that can impinge on Commission policy-making or policy implementation, the Juncker Commission may become an untamable beast that falls victim to stasis rather than innovation.
Tim McNamara is head of the Peercourt consultancy firm. He was previously political editor at the European Commission.
